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This study offers new evidence on the effects of plan provisions on 401(k) participation 
rates, exploiting microdata from the National Compensation Survey, a large, nationally 
representative, establishment dataset.  In particular, it closely considers the observed 
effects of the matching contributions made by employers to plan accounts, and makes 
direct comparisons between these effects and those of other plan provisions thought to 
affect participation: the availability of participant control over plan investment 
allocations; the option of drawing loans from plan accounts; and, especially, the 
institution of automatic enrollment in plans.  The study first places these effects within a 
broadly sketched theoretical model in which plan participation and the match rate are 
jointly determined.  This model puts results from the previous literature into context and 
helps define the “treatment effects” that different parties may find of interest.  It then 
addresses the potential endogeneity affecting measurement of these treatment effects by 
employing several different techniques: adding previously unused controls; 
distinguishing between different dimensions of the match; and employing instrumental 
variables.  The results of this analysis indicate that the effects of plan provisions vary 
dramatically between different income groups.  The results among workers in the lowest 
income group comport with a growing consensus in the literature: employer matches 
have little or no effect on participation, while automatic enrollment has dramatic effects.  
But among workers in the middle income group, employer matches have substantial 
effects that may be larger than the effects of automatic enrollment.   1
Introduction 
 
How do the different provisions of a 401(k) plan affect the participation rates of 
employees?  As traditional pensions continue their long decline and various changes to 
Social Security are contemplated, this question is becoming increasingly crucial to those 
concerned about the sufficiency of retirement savings among US workers.  In 2003, 39.9 
percent
1 of U.S. private industry workers had access
2 to a 401(k) plan in which 
employees were required to voluntarily make contributions in order to participate, with 
employers matching some of those contributions made.  Yet, only 67.9 percent of those 
with access to these plans participated; among lower-paid workers, the take-up rate
3 was 
even lower (59.6 percent).  These facts have fed the concern that many workers may be 
saving too little for retirement and strengthen the imperative for plan provisions that 
promote participation effectively. 
Although the literature has produced a variety of different estimates of how 
different 401(k) plan provisions affect participation, a particular picture of the broad 
contours of these effects has been consistently portrayed in a number of papers by Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian.  Primarily exploiting an extensive administrative database
4 linking 
employer-, plan- and employee-specific information, these authors have argued 
convincingly that a significant fraction of workers, disproportionately having relatively 
low incomes, act passively with regard to their 401(k)-related saving decisions.  
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations using the National Compensation Survey (NCS) microdata collected from newly-
initiated NCS sample members in 2003. 
2 Access to a benefit plan is defined in the National Compensation Survey according to the presence of a 
plan in the job/establishment pair; some workers are defined as having access even if they do not meet the 
applicable eligibility requirements. 
3 The take-up rate is defined in the National Compensation Survey as number of participants divided by 
number of workers with access (see footnote 1 above). 
4 Choi, Laibson and Madrian make repeated use of administrative data collected by Hewitt Associates, a 
large human resources consulting company, from some of its clients.   2
Consistent with this behavior, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian find that a) the rate at which 
employers match employee contributions has, at most, a moderate effect on participation; 
and b) the institution of automatic enrollment has effects that are quite large.  For those 
primarily interested in encouraging saving among the relatively less well-paid, this has 
led to the conclusion that automatic enrollment provisions are the best approach.  
Accordingly, in recent years legislative changes have aimed at encouraging automatic 
enrollment provisions
5, and the prevalence of such provisions has grown rapidly.  
Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2007) have additionally argued that the presence 
of automatic enrollment diminishes the need for employers to provide generous matches; 
if this logic is widely adopted, declines in match rate levels might be expected in the 
future.
6 
But since the evidence assembled by Choi, et al is not based on a representative 
sample of workers, its generalizability to the U.S. population remains in question.  
Indeed, other studies that have used different data samples have produced a wide variety 
of different results.  Some of these studies have been consistent with the findings of Choi, 
et al: Kusko, Poterba and Wilcox (1998), using administrative data from one employer, 
Munnell, Sunden and Taylor (2001/2002), using 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances 
data; and Mitchell, Utkus and Yang (2005), using administrative data from Vanguard, all 
find that employer match rates have relatively small effects on employee participation 
and contribution rates, if they have any effect at all.  But other studies have contradicted 
                                                 
5 For example, in 2006 the Pension Protection Act established a new avenue for employers to obtain “safe 
harbor” status, which allows an employer to automatically satisfy the plan’s non-discrimination 
requirements.  The requirements for reaching the safe harbor originally specified in 1996 included a 
potential employer match of 4 percent of pay, but the new law allows the safe harbor to be reached with a 
potential match of 3.5 percent of pay if enrollment is automatic. 
6  See, for example, Powell (2008).   3
this finding.  Using administrative data from Watson Wyatt, Clark and Schieber (1998) 
find that employees receiving a 50-75 percent match are 28 percentage points more likely 
to participate than employees receiving a 25 percent match.  Using data from the Health 
and Retirement Survey, Cunningham and Englehardt (2002) estimate that (unconditional) 
employee contributions were increased by about 19 percent by the employer matches 
observed in their sample.  None of these studies examined the effects of automatic 
enrollment provisions, but the variety of estimates of matching effects suggests that 
further testing of the automatic enrollment measures of the Choi, et al studies is also 
needed. 
In addition, different studies have employed different methods, causing different 
biases to be admitted in the estimates, or estimating parameters that are altogether 
different in concept.  For instance, Basset, Fleming and Rodrigues (1998) use 1993 CPS 
data to estimate a small impact of employer matches on employee participation rates.  
But Even and MacPherson (2005) use the same data, with a different methodology, to 
estimate that the presence of an employer match increases participation by 32.8 
percentage points.  Englehardt and Kumar (2007) find modest effects of matching on 
saving, despite the sizable effects on plan contributions estimated by Cunningham and 
Englehardt (2002) using the same data.  Papke (1995) produced two sets of measures 
from 1985-1986 IRS Form 5500 data; one set shows that employer matches play a large 
role in employee participation decisions, while the other indicates little or no effect. 
In this paper, a large, nationally representative dataset from 2002-2003 is 
exploited to provide measures of the effects of 401(k) plan provisions on the participation 
rates of employees.  The dataset contains sufficient details to estimate the effects of   4
several dimensions of employer matches, providing some leverage for disentangling the 
direct effects of the provisions on participation from effects that operate through sorting.  
It also allows estimation of the effects of automatic enrollment provisions, so that 
comparisons of the magnitudes of these effects are feasible, as well as investigation of 
some other plan provisions that are sometimes found to be important.  Finally, the unique 
structure of the dataset and linkages between the dataset and a larger survey of defined 
contribution costs allow the employment of instrumental variables to obtain estimates of 
the true treatment effect of employer matches on employee participation. 
The results of the study reinforce those of Choi, et al in some important ways: 
automatic enrollment provisions have substantial effects on plan participation, especially 
among relatively less well-paid workers.  And among such workers, the generosity of 
employer-provided match rates does not seem to affect participation at all.  But the 
results also show that match rates are an important motivator for some workers – those 
with intermediate levels of pay.  Among this group, the effect on participation of 
increasing the match rate may be even greater than the effect of instituting automatic 
enrollment.  This suggests that matching contributions still have an important role to play 
in stimulating retirement saving. 
 
Data 
The data come from the National Compensation Survey (NCS), a large, nationally 
representative survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Data from the 
NCS is used to calculate the Employment Cost Index, which estimates the growth in 
compensation costs, including those arising from employer-provided benefits, for a fixed   5
bundle of workers.  The NCS is collected with a rotating panel design, with a new panel 
initiated approximately once per year.  When a panel is initiated, brochures for 
employers’ benefit plans are collected along with the employer cost and benefit 
participation information.  The details of these plan brochures are coded into the NCS 
database, and the incidence of various detailed plan provisions are reported in official 
bulletins.  In this study, we use NCS microdata from the respondents initiated in 2002 
and 2003, focusing on the detailed provisions data collected from 401(k) plan brochures 
and the contemporaneous participation data collected from the corresponding 
establishments. 
The NCS microdata are collected at the job level: within each sampled 
establishment, a small number of narrowly defined jobs are selected.
7  The resulting 
wage, benefit costs, and participation data consist of averages among the employees at 
the establishment having that job description.  This sample design allows participation 
behavior to be associated with job attributes such as average wage rates in the job.  
However, it does not allow consideration of differences between workers’ wage rates 
within the job, nor to account directly for some other pertinent worker attributes such as 
age.  
The focus of this study is on one variant of 401(k) plans: the savings and thrift.  
Such plans entail voluntary (tax deductible) contributions by the employee that are 
matched to some extent by the employer.  This is easily the most prevalent form of 
401(k) plan, making up more than 80 percent of 401(k) plans in which the employer 
                                                 
7 Depending on the size of the establishment, between 1 and 8 jobs are sampled.   6
made some contributions in 2002-2003.
8  Not included in the study are plans to which 
employers make no contributions, which are also fairly prevalent.
9  Among savings and 
thrift plans, there is substantial variation in the way that the employer match is 
determined.  The majority of plans have a flat match profile – one percentage is applied 
to each employee’s contributions, up to a specified percentage of the employee’s salary.  
But a significant minority of plans applies a variable match rate, where employees 
receive one match rate to a first amount of their contributions and another (usually lower) 
rate on additional contributions, up to some limit.  A smaller minority has different match 
profiles for different employees within a job, depending on the employees’ tenure.  Still 
others have matches that vary from year to year, depending on employer profits or simply 
the employer’s discretion. This last group of plans is dropped from the sample; the others 
are included. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics about the plans in the sample.
10  82 
percent of the sample is made up of 401(k) plans with flat match rate profiles, while 13 
percent have match rates that change over the range of contributions made by employees, 
and the remainder has match profiles that depend on the employee’s tenure.  The average 
match rate on the first dollar contributed by employees is 75.37 percent, while the last 
dollar matched receives an average match of 68.64 percent.
11  Plans in the sample 
                                                 
8 Author’s calculations using the National Compensation Survey (NCS) microdata collected from newly-
initiated NCS sample members in 2002 and 2003. 
9 In 2005, an estimated 16 percent of private industry workers had access to cash deferred arrangements 
with no employer contributions.  These are not considered to be retirement benefit plans by the BLS.  (BLS 
Summary 05-01).  For more details about these “zero-match” plans, see section 9.5 of Holmer, Janney and 
Cohen (2008). 
10  For a more detailed presentation of the match provisions of these data in which weights have been used 
to allow estimates of prevalence among all US private industry employers, see Dworak-Fisher (2007). 
11  In order to calculate measures among the plans whose match profiles vary by tenure, we imputed the 
tenure distribution of each corresponding record based on the available information and detailed 
occupational averages, then averaged the match provisions across these imputed distributions.   7
provided matches on employee contributions up to 5.16 of the corresponding salary, on 
average.  Combining these provisions, we can determine the maximum potential 
matching contribution made by the employer under each plan.  The average of the 
“potential percentage match” in our sample is 3.57 percent of salary.  Converting this 
figure in dollars by multiplying it by the hourly wage times 2,000, the “potential dollar 
match” averages $1,657 in our sample. 
Some other characteristics of the sample are also visible from Table 1.  These 
include several additional provisions of the 401(k) plans: a very high percentage of the 
sample (85%) indicates that employees have some choice over how their own 
contributions are invested; a slightly smaller fraction (75%) indicates employee control 
over the employer’s contributions; 70 percent allow employees to draw loans from their 
401(k) accounts.  A small percentage of the plans in the sample (6 percent) are governed 
by the automatic enrollment provisions advocated by Choi, et al.  There is also a good 
deal of information about the compensation received by employees on these jobs: 40 
percent of the jobs indicate that they also provide a defined benefit plan, while only 21 
percent provide an additional defined contribution plan.
12  The average observation has a 
wage of $22.66 per hour, a health benefit costing the employer $2.21 per hour worked, 
and a defined benefit cost of $0.52 per hour worked.  Total compensation for this sample 
averages $33.10 per hour worked.  The data also contain detailed (6-digit) occupation and 
industry identifiers, as well as the location and employment of the establishments and 
                                                 
12  A very small fraction of sample members have more than one savings and thrift plan.  In such cases, we 
focus only on the plan that had the highest participation rate.   8
whether workers in the job are unionized.  The sample consists of 2,708 jobs in 587 
establishments
13, with 67 percent of jobs observed in 2003 and the rest observed in 2002.   
The dependent variable in the analysis is the participation rate for each job, 
defined as the fraction of workers in the job that participate in the plan.  This variable can 
generally be considered a take-up rate, as almost all employees in a job with access to the 
plan are eligible.  Yet, some plans have eligibility requirements based on months of 
service.  The average participation rate in the sample is .72.   
There is a significant amount of variation in the sample in both the match 
provisions and in the participation rates observed.  Figure 1 shows the frequency 
distributions of the first dollar match rate, the potential percentage match, and the 
observed participation rate.  One important feature of these distributions is that they 
exhibit spikes at round-numbered values, such 50 and 100 percent match rates and integer 
values of the potential percentage match.  Most important, note that the participation rate 
distribution has significant mass points at the extremes of the distribution: 29 percent of 
the observations have a participation rate of 1, and 6 percent have a rate of 0. 
 
Model of Participation in Employer-Provided 401(k) Plans 
Determination of Participation 
Consider the participation decisions of workers in a given establishment offering 
a plan with given provisions.  In particular, focus on the matching provisions of the plans, 
letting the other plan provisions be secondary considerations.  To start, think of the 
matching provisions at employer k as being defined by one generosity parameter, Mk, 
                                                 
13  This sample reflects all NCS sample members initiated in 2002 or 2003 for which valid data on match 
rates and participation were collected, with 1 establishment dropped due to outlying benefit cost values.    9
that is positively associated with both the percentage match rates applied to employee 
contributions and to the total potential employer contribution to each plan.  Employer k 
also has other relevant characteristics, including observed characteristics such as other 
provisions of its 401(k) plan, denoted as Ek, and those that are not observed, such as its 
“culture” as regards retirement saving, denoted as ck.  Worker i in job j at employer k 
determines whether or not to participate in the plan according to Mk, Ek, ck, and his own 
attributes – both observed attributes such as his income level, denoted as Xi, and 
unobserved attributes such as his innate attitude toward retirement saving, denoted as ai.  
Letting P*ijk be desired participation rate of worker i in job j, we have: 




ijk P E * k k k i i M E c X a ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β   (1.1) 
However, this desired participation is not observed.  A convincing series of 
studies has demonstrated that many workers are passive about putting their participation 
decisions into action: they are quite likely to remain at whatever participation (and 
contribution) level has been established by their past decisions and (especially) the plan 
default.  To incorporate this behavior into the model, let actual participation Pijk be 
updated (to P*ijk) in time period t with probability δ.  The Expected Value of Pijk at time t 
is thus: 
   [ ] ( ) 1 1 * − − − ⋅ + = ijkt ijk ijkt ijkt P P P P E δ  (1.2) 
Letting nijk be the tenure of worker i in job j at establishment k and P
D
k be the default 
participation decision at establishment k, the participation probability observed at any 
point in time is: 
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where  ) 1 (
ijk n
ijk δ ξ − = . 
A simplification that allows us to aggregate this expression up to the 
establishment level in a tractable way is to assume that the nijk is independent of the other 
explanatory variables.  Let ξ and δ  be the mean values of  ijk ξ  and 
ijk n δ , respectively, 
across all workers.  Letting  jk a  and  jk X  be the mean values of ai and Xi, respectively, 
within job j at establishment k, the expected participation rate among workers in 
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Determination of Matching Provisions 
There are competing explanations for why employers offer matching provisions in 
the 401(k) plans they sponsor.  One explanation is that employees demand the match as a 
preferred form of compensation.  As Brady (2006) describes, matching contributions by 
the employer increase the amount of employees’ compensation that is allowed to be tax-
deferred.  Employees might also value the employer match as a means of motivation for 
their retirement savings, or consider a high match as a signal of employer generosity in 
general.  This explanation is consistent with the results of the Employee Benefit 
Retirement Institute’s 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey, in which the majority of   11
respondents cited employee recruitment and retention, employee attitude and 
performance, or employee demand as the most important reason for offering a plan. 
Another explanation for the provision of Mk is portrayed by Ippolito (2002), who 
provides evidence that Defined Contribution plans disproportionately attract “savers” and 
disproportionately result in quits among “spenders.”  Since “savers” are more productive 
on the job than “spenders,” employers who offer Defined Contribution plans may enjoy a 
more productive workforce.   
Either of these stories may be sensibly extended to the determination of 401(k) 
match rates, providing a rationale for the diversity of plans observed in the country.  If 
employees of some establishments effectively demand matching contributions while 
others do not, then it is likely that employees at different establishments might effectively 
demand higher match rates than employees at other establishments.  And if some 
employers find the differential effects on workforce recruitment and retention great 
enough to offer a defined contribution plan while others do not, then it is likely that 
different employers will find different matching incentives to be optimal.  In either 
scenario, employers determine Mk to maintain a workforce with particular tastes for 
saving in a 401(k) plan, with higher values of Mk corresponding to higher average 
preferences for saving among workers at employer k.  
A natural corollary is that employers must also account for the actions of their 
labor market competitors in determining Mk.  Let Ok represent the generosity of other 
employers in the same labor market as employer k.  A higher value of Ok will cause 
employers trying to meet the demands of their workers to offer a more generous match, 
all else equal.  Alternatively, an employer attempting to differentially attract high savers   12
must offer a more generous match the greater the value of Ok.  Given this consideration, 
the determination of match generosity can be represented as: 
  e k k k k k k k E c O X a D M γ γ γ γ γ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0 ) , , ( .  (2.1) 
where Dk indicates the effective “demand” for matching contributions by the workers at 
establishment k, as well as the productivity incentive given to employer k to provide 
generous a match arising from the “differential” preference of savers for such matches.  
The arguments of Dk include the weighted averages  ( ) ∑ ⋅ = mk mk k a s a
r r
 and 
( ) ∑ ⋅ = mk mk k X s X , where sjk is the employment share of job j at employer k and m is 
an argument of summation. The employer characteristics variables ck and Ek are also 
included in equation (2.1) to account for miscellaneous heterogeneity in employers’ tastes 
for providing generous 401(k) matches. 
Assuming e k k k k k k k O X a O X a D ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0 ) , , ( , we 
have: 
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It is instructive to split k X  into two terms, jk jk X s ⋅  and  ( ) ∑ ⋅ =
≠ j m
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representing job j’s share and the share of all other establishment k jobs in the average 
characteristics of workers at establishment k, respectively.  With this change, the match 
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   13
or, condensing the terms, 
  = k M  
e k k
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Application of the Model to an Empirical Setting 
Equations (1.3) and (2.4) together describe a model that can be used to relate the 
values of Mk and Pjk observed in the labor market.  One application of this model is to 
shed light on the results of the cross-sectional analyses conducted in much of the 
literature on the effects of matching on participation.  In such analyses, the participation 
rate of a group of workers (say, Pjk) is regressed upon the match rate they face at their 
current employers (Mk), with controls for observed worker and employer traits (Xjk and 
Ek).  This type of analysis has been carried out using data aggregated up to the employer 
level (Papke, 1995; Clark and Schieber, 2002; Mitchell, Utkus and Yang, 2005) and data 
observed at the individual level (Munnell, Sunden and Taylor, 2000; Basset, Fleming and 
Rodrigues, 1998), with varying functional forms (OLS, Probit, etc.).   
Consider the following establishment-level OLS equation: 
  k k k k k M E X P ε α α α α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0 , (3.1) 
where the error term  k ε  includes all of the unobservable factors such as  k a  and  k c .  As 
much of the literature has noted, the parameter of interest from this equation ( 3 α ) does 
not yield an unbiased measure of the pure treatment effect of the match rate on workers, 
due to the presence of unobservables in the error term and their correlation with Mk.  The 
true value of  3 α  can be expressed in terms of the model’s parameters as: 
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where  k R
2  indicates the partial R-squared associated with the k-th term in equation 2.4.  







⋅  term in equation (4) captures the effect of high unobserved 
savings preferences being associated with increased match rate through job search – 







⋅  term adjusts similarly for 
unobserved (and correlated) employer characteristics – for example, the effect of 
employers’ enthusiasm for encouraging saving, which might manifest itself as both high 
match rates and a high amount of encouragement to save being given to employees. 
Note that the definition of the pure treatment effect is ambiguous – it depends on 
what affected outcome is of interest.  To capture the effects of Mk on the intentions of 
workers to participate, an uncontaminated measure of  5 β  is needed.  But the effect of Mk 
on the average worker’s behavior is more accurately captured by  5 β ξ ⋅ .  Alternatively, 
to evaluate broad-based policy ideas such as those that would provide government 
matches on individuals’ IRA contributions, we would be interested in a version of  5 β ξ ⋅  
in which ξ  were calculated by extending the adjustment of savings over a longer 
horizon. 
In addition, employers themselves may not be interested in the pure treatment 
effect per se; they are more likely interested in a measure that also includes the sorting 
effect.  For instance, if an employer were considering raising its match rate to achieve a   15
higher participation rate (perhaps in order to meet non-discrimination requirements), it 
would be interested in both the direct effects of the match increase on current workers 
and those that would raise the participation rate through worker turnover.  For such 























is negligible – e.g., if unmeasured employer characteristics that also affect participation 
directly underlie little of the variation in employer matches – then this might not differ 
much from the simple cross-sectional estimate described in equation (3.1). 
Estimating the effects of match rates without the influence of the sorting effects 
requires an alternative methodology.  A common approach in the literature is to analyze 
changes in participation behavior brought on by changes in the match rate within 
employers. This approach is used in an analysis of many employers by Papke (1995) and 
in case studies of individual employers by Kusko, Poterba and Wilcox (1998) and 
Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2007).  Such a differencing approach may net out 
the effects of unobserved worker and employer attributes if these attributes, ak and ck,, 
remain constant for the sample studied.  There are some concerns about this approach, 
though.  First, if the change in behavior is observed over a short period of time, then the 
measured effect will be especially attenuated by workers’ inertia.  For example, an 
analysis of participation changes over one unit of time will produces a measure of 
5 ) 1 ( β δ −  rather than  5 β ξ .  Studies that have used this approach have tended to use 
such short-term changes, perhaps in part because of the need to hold the observed sample   16
constant.
14   Second, the underlying assumption that the unobserved employer 
characteristics, ck, remain constant in these studies may be questioned.  For instance, it 
seems likely that changes in the provisions would be accompanied by changes in other 
aspects of the employer’s communications with its employees about the plan.  This 
concern is magnified by the inherently diminished scope of variation in match rates.  
Finally, studies that focus only on a small subset of employers may not be representative 
of the larger population; if they are focused on particular employers who change their 
match rates for idiosyncratic reasons, the results might also be idiosyncratic.  For 
example, if changes in match rates are precipitated by unsatisfactorily low participation 
rates, then these analyses will draw on observations from a particularly unresponsive 
population. 
The model directs us to several other avenues of inquiry that might help us isolate 
the direct effects of the match provisions on 401(k) participation from the sorting effects.  
The most immediate remedy to the omitted variable problem is to find additional controls 
for the variables omitted by other studies.  We explore this approach in the empirical 
analysis to follow by distinguishing different components of the compensation paid to 
workers in a job. 
A second approach is to differentiate between the forms of Mk appearing in 
equations (1.3) and (2.4).  In equation (1.3), the Mk term reflects the match rate’s effect 
as a marginal incentive to save at least one dollar.  The specific form of the plan’s match 
provisions that best captures this is the first-dollar match rate.  In contrast, the “potential 
                                                 
14  An exception is contained in Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2001).  Using a hazard model to 
analyze employees of a firm that introduced a relatively modest match to its 401(k) plan, they project that 
participation rates rise by 40 percent within the first 2 years.  Presumably, this effect would continue to   17
percentage match” described above may not matter in equation (1.3), except to the extent 
that it reflects a higher match rate.  For example, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick 
(2001) find that changing the match threshold without changing the match rate elicits no 
change in employees’ participation.  In equation (2.4), however, Mk is meant to capture 
the overall generosity of the plan, which may be best encapsulated by the total potential 
percentage match described above. 
To formalize this notion, let Fk represent the first-dollar match rate and Tk the 
total potential percentage match at employer k.  Then the determination of the match 
parameter by employers is represented by: 
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Further, let Tk and Fk be related as 
  k k k T F φ λ λ + ⋅ + = 1 0 . (5) 
In equation (5), k φ  captures random variation in the first-dollar match rate not associated 
with the selection and retention of workers with higher savings propensities.  Substituting 
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Equation (1.5) can be estimated using an OLS equation such as 
  k k k k k k F T E X P ε α α α α α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 4 3 2 1 0 . (3.2) 
                                                                                                                                                 
grow if the projection were carried out for even longer, but the authors note that such projections are 
speculative.   18
If there is no residual correlation between  k φ  and  k ε , then 4 ˆ α  is an unbiased estimator 
of  5 β ξ
L . 
A third approach to measuring the effect of the employer match on employee 
participation that follows from the model is to use the measurable factors appearing in 
equation (2.4) – Ok and  jk X~  –  to instrument for Mk.  We explore this approach as well 




An appropriate way to measure the cross-sectional effects described in equation 
(3.1) is to implement the Bernoulli Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (BQMLE) 
developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).  The BQMLE deals appropriately with 
fractional dependent variables having masses in the distribution at 0 and 1.  Assume that 
the expected value of Pjk is captured by the standard normal cumulative density function 
conditional on the specified explanatory variables (Zjk):  
  ) ( ) | ( β jk jk jk Z x P E Φ = . (6) 
The BQMLE is computed by maximizing 
  )] ( 1 log[ ) 1 ( )] ( log[ ) ( b Z P b Z P b jk jk jk jk jk Φ − − + Φ = l . (7) 
Table 2 gives the estimated average partial effects (APE’s) of this cross-sectional 
analysis, using the log of the first dollar match rate as the key explanatory variable.  In 
the first column, the match variable is entered with only controls for year of observation   19
and eligibility requirements of at least 1 year of service.
15  The results indicate that a 
doubling of the first dollar match rate is associated with a 5.90 percentage point increase 
in workers’ participation.
16   As illustrated in equation (4), these effects include the 
impact of sorting arising from workers’ choices of employers, as well as any correlations 
between unobserved employer characteristics affecting participation and the match rate. 
In the second column, controls have been added for observable employer 
characteristics Ek.  These include (1-digit) industry, region (9 Census divisions), 
establishment size, and other provisions of the 401(k) plan.  If these controls are 
comprehensive enough, then we can interpret the resulting estimate of the match rate’s 
APE as the treatment effect plus the sorting effect – the total effect that employers might 
be interested in.  The estimate shows that a doubling of the first-dollar match rate results 
in a 5.95 percentage point increase in employee participation.  Among the other plan 
characteristics, only the automatic enrollment provision has a significant effect. 
The third column shows the effects when additional controls for observable job 
characteristics, meant to stand in for worker attributes jk X , are included in the model.  
These include a dummy for whether the job is unionized, dummies for 9 occupational 
groups, the average compensation paid workers in the job, and the average compensation 
squared.  With these controls included, the APE of a doubling of the first-dollar match is 
now a 5.12 percentage point increase.  These results are consistent with a small positive 
                                                 
15  These dummies are included in all specifications. 
16  Based on experimentation with various functional forms, specifying the match rate in logs appears to be 
a reasonable approach.   All of the functional forms depicted an effect of match rates on participation that is 
positive and diminishing.  For example, a model in which the first-dollar match is divided into categories of 
10-25 percent (excluded), 26-50 percent, 51-75 percent, and >75 percent produced partial effects of 6.20, 
12.22, and 11.75, respectively.   20
sorting effect having been included in the match rate effects shown in the second column.  
Compensation itself is seen to have a sizable and diminishing effect on participation. 
A potential shortcoming of this analysis is that explicit controls for workers’ 
demographic traits have not been included in the measure of  jk X .  Many studies of plan 
participation have included such controls, with varying results.  Gender is often found to 
be insignificant, but some studies show that, among low-earners, men are less likely to 
participate than women (Papke, 2003; Mitchell, Utkus and Yang, 2005).  Education also 
turns up insignificant in some multivariate analyses, but in other cases (Kusko, Poterba 
and Wilcox, 1998; Basset, Fleming and Rodrigues, 1998) is found to be positively related 
to participation.  Race is often not included in analyses, but some evidence (Even and 
MacPherson, 2003; Englehardt and Kumar, 2007) suggests that white workers are more 
likely to participate than are blacks.  The two characteristics that are most consistently 
found to have positive, significant effects on participation are income and age.  As we 
have seen, the data capture income very well through job-level compensation, and its 
inclusion in the regression moderates the measure of the effect of employer matches.  
Whether controlling for age (or any other omitted factor) would also decrease the 
measure of the match’s effect depends on the extent to which workers also sort into high-
matching jobs based on these factors. 
To explore the effects of demographic traits on 401(k) participation and their 
potentially biasing impact on the measures of the effects of plan provisions, job averages 
of various traits were imputed for each observation.  These imputations were generated 
by matching the detailed (3-digit) industry and occupation information, along with the 
observed wage rate in the job, to 2002 Current Population Statistics data and using   21
regression analysis to predict values for each job.  Four demographic variables were 
produced this way: the average age of workers in the job, the percentage of workers who 
are male, the percentage having graduated from college, and the percentage who are 
white.   
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 give the results of two equations 
incorporating these variables.  In column (4), the broad industry and occupation variables 
previously included are omitted, while in column (5) these controls are added back in.  
When the separate occupation and industry controls are excluded, the imputed 
demographic traits show several effects that are consistent with the literature: age and 
percent white have significantly positive effects, and percent male is negative but 
marginally insignificant.  Contrary to the literature, the imputed percentage of college 
graduates has a significantly negative effect on participation.  When the broad industry 
and occupation control are added back in, this education effect becomes positive, and the 
other measured demographic effects remain in the “right” direction, but they are 
generally small and statistically insignificant.  This suggests that the industry and 
occupation controls included in column (3) capture some of the same underlying 
demographics that the imputed demographic variables do.  Since the imputed traits 
improve the log pseudo-likelihood of the model, the full specification in column (5) is 
preferred.  Note that the inclusion of these imputed traits does not reduce the measured 
effect of the employer match – in fact, the APE of a doubling of the match rises to 5.34 
percentage points in column (5). 
These first 5 columns of Table 2 have largely applied the cross-sectional 
approaches that have been applied elsewhere.  But, as discussed above, the criticism of   22
those other studies also remains: if the controls entered for  jk X  and  k E  are incomplete, 
leaving substantial unmeasured components  jk a  and  k c , then the measured effects of 
k M  on  jk P  may not reflect the pure treatment effect.  In particular, we might be most 
concerned about the effects of worker sorting: even controlling for many worker 
attributes through the job-level variables jk X , the residual preferences of workers for 
generous retirement benefits may still correlate with high participation rates.  One 
approach to solving this difficulty allowed by the National Compensation Survey data 
used in this study is to include additional control variables capturing workers’ revealed 
preference for receiving compensation in the form of key benefits.  Workers who are not 
interested in saving for retirement – Ippolito’s “spenders” – are likely to prefer a larger 
portion of their compensation in wages.  Those who have a high underlying 401(k) 
participation propensity – Ippolito’s “savers” – are likely to prefer other benefits as well 
instead of wage.  This seems especially likely to be true of health benefits. 
In column (6) of Table 2, additional controls accounting for the composition of 
workers’ compensations have been included: the wage component of compensation, the 
health care component, the component associated with any Defined Benefit plan present 
for the job, and a dummy indicating whether workers in the job have access to another 
Defined Contribution plan.  The results show that a higher health plan component of 
compensation is significantly associated with higher participation in one’s 401(k).  The 
presence of other Defined Contribution plans is also associated with higher participation. 
These results suggest some savings propensity-related job sorting on these two benefit 
categories.  But similar sorting is not apparent on the wage-nonwage frontier, nor on 
defined benefit plans.  And adding these controls does not reduce our estimate of the   23
effect of the employer match – in fact, it increases it.  The APE of doubling the match 
rate is now 5.90 percentage points.  In the rest of the paper, this full-specification cross-
sectional model reported in column (6) is referred to as the base model. 
In the base model, several of the measured effects of other 401(k) plan provisions 
are worth noting.  First, the APE of automatic enrollment provisions remains at a 
substantial level: automatic enrollment is seen to increase participation by 7.4 percentage 
points.  This is within the margin of error of the 11 point increase that Madrian and Shea 
(2001) find studying one large employer.  Second, providing workers with a choice of 
how to invest their own contributions appears to have a small but significant, negative 
association on participation.  This is consistent with the results of Iyengar, Jiang and 
Huberman (2003) and Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2006), who argue that too much 
choice can impart complexity costs that reduce plan enrollment.  But having choice over 
the employer’s contributions does not appear to have any appreciable effect on 
participation.  Both of these APEs contradict Papke (2003), who finds dramatic positive 
effects.  Finally, the ability to draw loans from one’s account has an insignificant effect 
on participation as well. 
 
Distinguishing dimensions of the match 
Another approach to isolating the treatment effect of employer matches on 
participation is to control for the overall generosity of the plan, as illustrated in equation 
(3.2) above.   Table 3 presents the results obtained by adding our total percentage match 
variable to the right hand side of the equations analyzed in Table 2
17.  In every column, 
the inclusion of the overall generosity measure has reduced the APE of the first dollar   24
match.  But this reduction (and the direct effect of the total percentage match) declines 
and becomes insignificant as more controls are added to the equation.  In column (6), we 
are left with an APE for the first dollar match of .0451.  This suggests that the effects 
observed in the base model may not be distorted much by worker sorting of the type 
described in our model. 
But note that this identification approach relies on two restrictions: the operation 
of the treatment effect solely through the first-dollar match, and the operation of the 
sorting effect solely through the total percentage match.  Either of these restrictions could 
be challenged.  For instance, the overall generosity of the match may itself have a direct 
effect on participation; in this case, controlling for the total potential match nets out some 
of the treatment effect.  Alternatively, high first-dollar match rates for a given level of 
generosity may evidence attempts by employers to coax participation out of workers with 
below-average savings propensities; in this case, some (negative) sorting on the first-
dollar match is not controlled for by the total potential match variable.  Thus, while the 
results of Table 3 are suggestive of some positive sorting on match rates, alternative 
methods for isolating the treatment effect are desired. 
 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
We can also estimate the treatment effect of the first-dollar match rate on plan 
participation by instrumenting for the match rate.  The model suggests two candidates for 
valid instruments – the variables that appear in the match determination equation (2.4) 
but not in the participation equation (1.3).  First, the characteristics of an individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
17  An alternative analysis with total percentage match entered in logs produced very similar results.   25
coworkers,  jk X~ , play an integral role in the determination of the match, but they may 
not affect the individual’s participation directly.  To exploit this, several measures of 
jk X~  were calculated from the data.  For each job j in establishment k, the average 
compensation among jobs sampled from k, excluding job j, was measured.  In addition, 
similar calculations were made using each of the imputed demographic characteristics 
(age, proportion with a college degree, proportion male, and proportion white).  Note that 
these measures embody an additional measurement error.  While the object of interest is a 
measure of the average characteristics of all other workers at establishment k, our 
measure includes only those that were sampled in the National Compensation Survey.  
But since jobs in each establishment were randomly sampled with probability 
proportional to the numbers of workers in the jobs, our measure of  jk X~ is unbiased.  
Two variables were generated to capture Ok.  These variables measure the average 
proportion of compensation paid to defined contribution plans among other employers in 
the corresponding labor market.   They were calculated using the larger NCS dataset 
measuring employer costs for all units in the NCS panel (not just those that were newly 
initiated in 2002 or 2003).  The first of these measures uses geography to define the 
relevant labor market, taking advantage of the cluster sample design of the NCS, in which 
a small set of (predominantly metropolitan) areas is selected as primary sampling units.  
Within each of these areas, the average fraction of compensation spent by employers on 
Defined Contribution plans was calculated.  The second measure of Ok is calculated 
similarly, but using 2-digit industry definitions as the relevant labor market concept.   
   26
These measures relate somewhat to the instruments used by Even and MacPherson 
(2005), who instrument for Mk with the demographic characteristics of workers in the 
same industry-size cells as those in their dataset.  Even and MacPherson’s results suggest 
that cross-sectional measures may under-estimate the effects of match rates due to 
negative sorting in of workers between jobs.  While our instruments are similar in spirit 
to those of Even and MacPherson, they should better capture significant amounts of 
variation in Mk.  The co-worker measures ( jk X~ ) are similarly based on demographics, 
but they more directly measure spillovers between workers’ demands because they are 
calculated within employers.  The labor market measures (Ok) are similarly based on 
sectors, but they more directly measure the effects of competition because they are based 
on measures of DC plan generosity actually dispensed in the relevant markets. 
Table 4 presents results obtained by using the instrumental variables methodology 
described Wooldridge (2005).  That is, equation (2.4) describing the determination of 
k M  was estimated using OLS, and the residuals,  e η ˆ , were added to the BQMLE model 
of participation with the full complement of explanatory variables examined in column 
(6) of Table 2.  The corrected standard errors were then estimated using the methodology 
described in Papke and Wooldridge (2007).  This methodology also readily allows testing 
of the validity of the instrumental approach: standard t-tests (using the corrected standard 
errors) can be applied to the estimated coefficient on  e η ˆ . 
In the top panel of Table 4, the APEs on participation using the instrumental 
variables methodology are listed.  The top row contains the APEs of the first-dollar 
match rate, and the second row contains the APEs of the first-stage residuals, which 
includes any endogenous variation relating to worker sorting across plans.  The three   27
columns contain the results for different sets of instruments: the co-worker instruments 
jk X~ , the labor market instruments Ok, and the combination of all instruments.  These 
estimates were generated using a slightly reduced sample of 2,372 observations in 464 
establishments, as we limit our scrutiny to only those observations for which a full set of 
instruments could be generated (e.g., establishments having data for only one collected 
job are excluded). 
Instrumenting with the co-worker measures alone, the estimated APE of the first-
dollar match rate indicates that a doubling of the match rate increases participation by 
17.36 percentage points.  This implies that the cross-sectional results shown in Table 2 
are influenced by substantial amounts of negative sorting, which is borne out by the 
substantial (-.1233) and statistically significant estimated APE of the first-stage residual.  
Using only the labor market instruments, we estimate that the match rate has an even 
greater effect; the estimated APE is .4532, and both it and the APE of the residual term 
are statistically significant despite large standard errors.   Using all co-worker and labor 
market instruments, the estimated APE of the log first-dollar match rate is .2147, and the 
APE of the first-stage residual is again a significantly negative. 
These results reinforce those of Even and MacPherson in portraying the 
determination of match rates as significantly motivated by a desire to increase the saving 
rates of the workers who have low underlying savings propensities.  Such a behavior 
could be caused by employers having paternalist motives or by their efforts to satisfy the 
non-discrimination rules that apply to 401(k) plans.  If, in fact, this behavior is driven by 
non-discrimination rules, we might observe differences in how it applies to different 
populations; we will return to this topic below.  Little direct evidence of this dynamic has   28
been documented, but Bernheim and Garrett (2003) and Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz 
(1996) provide evidence that a similar, “remedial” impetus is prevalent for employer-
provided financial education programs. 
Confidence in these results depends on the validity of the instruments.  The 
bottom panel of Table 4 provides information from the first stage of each estimation.  
First, the coefficients from the OLS regressions of the log of the first-dollar match on the 
instruments is listed (coefficients of all other exogenous variables are suppressed).  These 
coefficients seem generally to be plausible; e.g., having well-paid and well-educated co-
workers seems to increase one’s match rate.  Having older co-workers seems to decrease 
one’s match rate, which contradicts the positive correlation between age and plan 
participation.  But it seems plausible that employers with older workers would have less 
of an imperative to sort between savers and spenders.  The labor market measures both 
have positive coefficients, although the regional variable is not statistically significant.  
At the bottom of the table, the partial R-Squared and F-Test on the excluded instruments 
as discussed by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and Shea (1997) are listed.  These 
indicate that the instruments are relatively weak, together explaining less than 2 percent 
of the residual variation in the match rate, but that they are strong enough to assuage 
concerns about finite-sample bias.  The weakness is especially pronounced when the 
labor market measures are the only instruments; in subsequent tables, we focus on 
specifications that include co-worker instruments. 
The low first-stage R-Squareds in Table 4 make it especially imperative to verify 
the exogeneity of the instruments.  In particular, the exogeneity of  jk X~  might be 
compromised if co-workers directly affect each others’ plan participation.  As discussed   29
by Duflo and Saez (2002), such network effects can operate through a variety of 
mechanisms if co-workers have frequent contact with each other.  If they do, then our IV 
estimates of match effects will be biased upward.  Duflo and Saez offer some ways of 
exploring whether network effects are prevalent in our measures of  jk X~ .  They note 
that university workers in small departments are much more likely to interact with each 
other directly than those in large departments; therefore, the network effects will be more 
pronounced in small departments.  In fact, their analysis shows no significant network 
effects within larger departments. 
We can apply this insight to our analysis, with a complication: a maximum of 8 
jobs are sampled within each NCS respondent, so  jk X~  is measured with greater error 
among large establishments in our data.  So while direct networking effects in large 
establishments may be limited, the measure of co-worker demand for matches is also less 
reliable.  An intermediate group of establishments have the highest potential for well-
measured demand effects that are not affected by direct networking effects: 
establishments with between 100 and 500 employers are sampled with the full 8 jobs 
(smaller establishments yield lower numbers of jobs) but are big enough to significantly 
dampen any network effects. 
Table 5 depicts the results of our analysis as applied to large, mid-sized, and small 
establishments.  The first column lists the sample sizes of each group; while the 
observation counts vary widely, the groups have relatively similar establishment counts.  
In the second column, we list the APEs from the base model as applied to the restricted 
sample.  These results show a higher match effect among mid-sized establishments, 
where the APE is .1394.  The APEs among large and small establishments are   30
statistically insignificant.  When we apply our instrumental variables to these samples in 
column (3), we see possible evidence of endogeneity in the co-worker instruments.  We 
estimate significantly higher APEs, and significant negative sorting, among the small 
establishments, where networks effects are most likely.  But no significant sorting is 
measured among mid-sized establishments, where we expect networking effects, if any, 
to be small.  These results are consistent with endogeneity problems in the instruments. 
On the other hand, the results also show negative sorting (and higher APEs) among the 
largest employers, where networking effects are least likely, and these effects are 
statistically significant despite larger standard errors. 
Duflo and Saez offer an alternative approach to dealing with this potential 
endogeneity.  In their study, when the co-worker measures match dissimilar workers, 
networking effects become insignificant.  In column (4), this insight is applied: we use 
adjusted co-worker measures that are calculated only using co-workers who do not share 
the same (1-digit) occupation as the reference worker.  Using these adjusted instruments, 
we obtain a smaller APE for the full sample, but the APE is still notably higher than the 
base model measure.  The APEs measured within establishment sizes diminish 
significantly, with the APE among small establishments now statistically insignificant.  
Most strikingly, the APEs among mid-size and large establishments are .2170 and .2112, 
respectively; both are statistically significant.  These results indicate that match rates 
have substantial effects on plan participation and suggest that the base model may 
underestimate these effects.  But while the adjusted instruments instill greater confidence 
about their exogeneity, they are even weaker in the first stage, causing the associated 
standard errors to be high.  Consequently, the coefficients on  e η ˆ  are not statistically   31
significant.  Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the base results are not upwardly 
biased and are likely to be downwardly biased by negative sorting in the matching of 
workers and match rates. 
 
Differences by Income Level 
In Table 6, the APEs are measured separately for three income groups.  Columns 
(2) and (3) report the APEs for the log first dollar match and the automatic enrollment 
provision, respectively, estimated from the base, cross-sectional equation.  These results 
indicate large differences in behavior between the income groups.  The match rate has 
small but significant measured effects among the high- and middle-income groups, but no 
effect on the low-income group.  The automatic enrollment provision, however, is 
negligible among the high-income group and very large – with an APE of .2367 – among 
the low-income group; the middle-income group displays an intermediate automatic 
enrollment effect. 
In columns (4) and (5), instrumental variables estimates for the income groups are 
shown, with both co-worker and labor market instruments employed, and separate 
columns for the two alternative sets of co-worker measures.  In the high-income group, 
the APEs of the match rate fall considerably and are significantly negative, and the 
(positive) sorting effect is also significant.  Among the middle-income group, the APEs 
rise considerably and negative sorting is evident, although the sorting is again not 
statistically significant.  Among the low income group, the APEs continue to be 
negligible, and sorting is not evident.   32
These results portray a compelling story about 401(k) participation that was 
obscured when we studied the entire sample together.  The positive sorting among high 
earners suggests that these workers may have a high amount of bargaining power with 
their employers – high earners wishing to save in a 401(k) may effectively push for 
higher matches.  Alternatively, employers’ desire to sort between “savers” and 
“spenders” may be especially great among high earners.  But once these workers have 
been sorted, they are not attracted to greater participation by higher match rates.  
Consistent with this story, these workers are also unresponsive to automatic enrollment 
provisions. 
Middle income workers, however, seem to be quite responsive to the match rate 
in deciding whether to participate in their 401(k) plans.  The APEs in Table 6 indicate 
that a doubling of the match rate will add more than 20 percentage points to their 
participation rates.  These workers, with relatively high levels of income despite 
qualifying as non-highly compensated workers (NHCEs), and behaviorally responsive to 
the match rate, are prime targets for employers needing to (remedially) boost NHCE 
contributions to meet non-discrimination rules.  The apparent negative sorting on match 
rates seen in this group is consistent with this characterization.  Perhaps most 
interestingly middle-income workers may be more responsive to significant match rate 
increases than they are to the implementation of automatic enrollment provisions.  
Therefore, matching contributions may have a significant role to play in encouraging 
saving among the middle class.  This is a significant departure from the growing 
literature discussed earlier.   33
Among low earners, the story told by the emerging literature re-appears.  Low 
income workers do not appear to be influenced at all by matching provisions, either in the 
participation decision or in sorting themselves among workers.  At the same time these 
workers are greatly influenced by automatic enrollment.  This suggests passive decision-
making about saving and a low amount of bargaining power with employers. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, I have re-examined and added to a large and growing body of 
evidence on the determinants of participation in 401(k) plans, paying particularly close 
attention to the effects of employer matches.  This focus is timely, since matching 
provisions have been fading from the attention of many who have offered automatic 
enrollment as a better solution to the problem of under-saving.  The previous literature on 
this topic has covered a wide range of methods, each with its own pros and cons.  It has 
exploited a wide range of datasets, most of which lack generalizability.  And it has made 
few comparisons between the effects of the match and the effects of automatic 
enrollment.  Consequently, it has produced a wide range of estimates that are hard to 
synthesize and even harder to put into perspective. 
By employing several estimation strategies, placing them within a single 
framework, and using a large, broad dataset that has information on many aspects of 
401(k) plan provisions, this study is able to offer some clarity to the issue.  Considering 
the population as a whole, I find that the level of the employer match has a significant 
effect on plan participation, and that this effect is observed not because workers 
positively sort into generous plans, but because they respond rationally to the marginal   34
incentives when deciding whether to participate.  This may be welcome news to those 
who have wondered at the lack of rationality identified in the recent literature on 
automatic enrollment. 
The most illuminating results come when workers of different income groups are 
considered separately.  The results among lower-income workers reinforce the recent 
literature, with automatic enrollment producing large effects and matching contributions 
none.  This implies that the recent efforts to encourage automatic enrollment provisions 
have been appropriate ways to increase retirement saving among this group.  But among 
intermediate-level earners, the picture is less clear.  This group shows significant 
responses to employer matches that may be larger than those associated with automatic 
enrollment.  Thus policies to encourage and/or maintain retirement savings among the 
middle class should advocate a significant role for traditional incentives of this nature.  
Finally, the results provide a picture of the underlying determination of the matches 
themselves: higher matches appear to be aimed at sorting and attracting workers among 
the highest level of earnings, and/or to stimulating savings among middle-earning 
workers.  This implies that the non-discrimination rules governing 401(k) plans are an 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for NCS  Data Sample
(2,708 jobs in 587 establishments)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation




Varies by Contribution 0.13 0.34
Varies by Tenure 0.04 0.21
Gen ero sit y
F irst Dollar Match R ate 75.37 37.27
Last Dollar Match Rate 68.64 32.36
P e rcent of S a lary Ma tched 5.16 1.96
Potential Percentage Match 3.57 1.98
Potential Dollar Match 1,657 1,644
Other Plan Provisions
Control of EE Contribs 0.85 0.36
Control of E R  Contribs 0.75 0.43
Availability of Loans 0.70 0.46
Automatic E nrollment 0.06 0.23
Compensat ion
Total Compensation 33.10 23.35
Wage 22.62 16.21
Health Cost 2.20 1.19
DB  Cost 0.52 1.40
DB  Coverage 0.40 0.49
Other DC 0.21 0.41
Data Details
Year= 2003 0.67 0.47
Establis hment Characteristics
Size: Less than 20 0.09 0.29
Si z e:  2 0 - 5 0 0. 0 6 0 .2 4
S ize: 50-100 0.10 0.30
S ize: 100-250 0.16 0.36
S ize: 250-500 0.14 0.35
S ize: 500-1,000 0.12 0.33
S ize: 1,000-2,500 0.13 0.34
S ize: 2,500-5,000 0.11 0.31
S ize: 5000-10,000 0.06 0.23
Size: Greater than 10,000 0.03 0.16
New England 0.06 0.23
Middle Atlantic 0.15 0.36
E ast North Central 0.17 0.37
West North Central 0.09 0.28
S outh Atlantic 0.16 0.37
East South Central 0.02 0.14
West S outh Central 0.16 0.37
Mountain 0.10 0.30
Pacif ic 0.10 0 .3 0
Mining/Construction 0.05 0.22
Manufacturing 0.18 0.38




Public Administration 0.21 0.41
Job Charact eristics
Unionization 0.05 0.22  40
Table 2:  Estimated Average Partial Effects on 401(k) Participation with First-Dollar Match as S ole Generosity Measure
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Employer Job Compensation
Characteristics Characteristics Imputed Demographics Components 
Base Included Included Included Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of First-Dollar Match 0.0590 0.0595 0.0512 0.0550 0.0534 0.0590
(0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0191)
Other Plan Provisions
Automatic Enrollment 0.0862 0.0871 0.0886 0.0834 0.0741
(0.0387) (0.0376) (0.0400) (0.0380) (0.0419)
Investment Choice (Own Contribs) - 0.0471 -0.0563 -0.0706 -0.0541 -0.0571
(0.0344) (0.0320) (0.0325) (0.0318) (0.0317)
Investment Choice (Employer Contribs) 0.0160 0.0201 0.0319 0.0287 0.0156
(0.0311) (0.0291) (0.0300) (0.0280) (0.0291)
Loan Availability - 0.0057 -0.0165 -0.0117 -0.0171 -0.0186
(0.0233) (0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0208)
Job-Level Attributes
Compen sation 0.0079 0.0080 0.0069 0.0073
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0018)
Compen sation  Squ ar ed - 0.000029 -0.000030 -0.000026 - 0.000020
(0.000004) (0.000005) (0.000005) (0.000005)
Imputed Demographics
Average Age 0.0045 0.0023 0.0037
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Percent College Grad -0.0747 0.0730 0.0721
(0.0408) (0.0703) (0.0707)
Percent Whit e 0.4001 0.1468 0.1528
(0.1270) (0.1469) (0.1456)
Percent Male -0.0428 -0.0193 -0.0075
(0.0262) (0.0323) (0.0323)
Compen sation  Compon ents
Wage -0.0032
(0.0020)




Other DC Plan Present 0.0826
(0.0230)
Other Controls
Region and Estab Size Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Union, Occupation Controls No No Yes No Yes Yes  41
Table 3:  Estimated Average Partial Effects on 401(k) Participation with First-Dollar Match and Total Percentage Match S eparated
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Employer Job Compensation
Characteristics Characteristics Imputed Demographics Components 
Base Included Included Included Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of First-Dollar Match 0.0254 0.0350 0.0371 0.0338 0.0384 0.0451
(0.0268) (0.0251) (0.0227) (0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0232)
Total Percentage Match 0.0141 0.0105 0.0060 0.0091 0.0065 0.0061
(0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0063)
Other Plan Provisions
Automatic Enrollment 0.0901 0.0896 0.0917 0.0859 0.0767
(0.0388) (0.0379) (0.0400) (0.0383) (0.0422)
Investment Choice (Own Contribs) - 0.0550 -0.0608 -0.0769 -0.0588 -0.0613
(0.0347) (0.0324) (0.0330) (0.0323) (0.0321)
Investment Choice (Employer Contribs) 0.0219 0.0234 0.0369 0.0210 0.0187
(0.0319) (0.0297) (0.0310) (0.0293) (0.0296)
Loan Availability - 0.0056 -0.0163 -0.0121 -0.0169 -0.0184
(0.0233) (0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0208)
Job-Level Attributes
Compen sation 0.0078 0.0078 0.0067 0.0072
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0018)
Compen sation  Squ ar ed - 0.000028 -0.000029 -0.000025 - 0.000020
(0.000004) (0.000005) (0.000005) (0.000005)
Imputed Demographics
Average Age 0.0048 0.0025 0.0039
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Percent College Grad -0.0713 0.0737 0.0723
(0.0408) (0.0704) (0.0708)
Percent Whit e 0.3944 0.1475 0.1538
(0.1273) (0.1470) (0.1453)
Percent Male -0.0409 -0.0191 -0.0075
(0.0262) (0.0322) (0.0321)
Compen sation  Compon ents
Wage -0.0031
(0.0020)




Other DC Plan Present 0.0823
(0.0230)
Other Controls
Region and Estab Size Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Union, Occupation Controls No No Yes No Yes Yes  42
 
Table 4:  Details of Instrumental Variables Analysis (Instruments Include All Co-Workers)
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Co-Wor ke r
Co-Worker Market Characteristics
Characteristics Measures And Market
Only Only Measures
(1) (2) (3)
Average Partial Effects of Match
Log of First-Dollar Match 0.1736 0.4532 0.2147
(0.0741) (0.1819) (0.0618)
First-St age Residual - 0.1233 - 0.4036 - 0.1659
(0.0747) (0.1832) (0.0633)
First-St age Coefficients
Co-Workers' Compensation 0.0095 0.0091
(0.0038) (0.0037)
Co-Workers' Compensation Squared - 0.000073 - 0.000069
(0.000031) (0.000031)
Co-Workers' Age - 0.0159 - 0.0168
(0.0054) (0.0054)
Co-Workers' Percent Male - 0.1758 - 0.2171
(0.0701) (0.0709)
Co-Workers' Percent White - 0.5891 - 0.6270
(0.2883) (0.2880)
Co-Workers' Percent College Graduate 0.0680 0.0665
(0.0947) (0.0945)
Other Employers' DC Fraction in Area 1.9710 1.8154
(1.8785) (1.8770)
Other Employers' DC Fraction in Industry 5.9911 7.1124
(1.8274) (1.8725)
First-Stage Diagnostics
Partial R-Squared 0.0104 0.0050 0.0168
Adjusted F-Test 24.97 11.90 40.70Table 5:  Instrumental Variables Results by Establishment Size
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Third Line: Significance of Instrument (.10 los)




Sa mple  Si ze Characterist ics Characteristics
Observations Base And Market And Market
Sample (Establishments) Results Measures Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Observations 2372 0.0522 0.2147 0.1410
(464) (0.0209) 0.0618 (0.0701)
Yes No
0.0168 0.0120
Establishment Employment >500 1120 0.0319 0.2298 0.2112
(171) (0.0324) (0.1051) (0.1185)
Yes No
0.0430 0.0307
Establishment Employment 100-500 711 0.1394 0.0755 0.2170
(143) (0.0391) (0.0773) (0.0735)
No No
0.0932 0.0826
Establishment Employment <=500 541 -0.0103 0.2000 0.1336
(150) (0.0367) (0.1336) (0.1429)
Yes No
0.0565 0.0524  Table 6:  Instrumental Variables Results by Compensation Level
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Third Line: Significance of Instrument (.10 los)
Fourth Line: First-Stage Partial R-Squared
IV Results
Ad ju ste d
Co-Worker Co-Worker
Sa mple  Si ze Automat ic Characteristics Characteristics
Observations Base Enrollment  And Market And Market
S ample (Establishments) Results Effect Measures Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Observat ions 2372 0.0522 0.1040 0.2147 0.1410
(461) 0.0209 (0.0395) 0.0618 0.0701
Yes No
0.0168 0.0120
Average Hourly Compensation >=$36 788 0.0532 0.0334 -0.1796 -0.1782
(293) (0.0238) (0.0365) (0.0782) (0.0715)
Yes Yes
0.0448 0.0511
Average Hourly Compensation $21-36 785 0.0589 0.1219 0.2096 0.2506
(350) (0.0288) (0.0395) (0.1574) (0.1439)
No No
0.0180 0.0200
Average Hourly Compensation <$21 805 -0.0026 0.2367 0.0597 -0.0060
(150) (0.0328) (0.0613) (0.1985) (0.2955)
No No
0.0341 0.0159  